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Arbitration Procedures
Theodore J. St. Antoine

I am in the uncomfortable position of being the primary expositor
on a subject that I think is very much a matter of discretion in most
cases, that is, how an arbitrator handles a hearing. One of the common
characteristics I have detected among arbitrators is their apparent certitude on a disputed issue, even though they may disagree violently with
other experienced arbitrators. Some of them will say that whatever internal anguish or difficulty an arbitrator has in coming to a decision, he
should never display that to the parties. I myself cannot accept that
advice simply because I am a perennial worrier and never quite sure
about anything; it would be pure fakery for me to exhibit any other
attitude. I think that the surest way to get along with the parties is to
be oneself and not try to emulate others.

Method of Designation
The way an arbitrator responds in dealing with the parties will
depend to some extent upon the method of his designation. There are
several different ways in which designation of an arbitrator can come
about. Formal appointing agencies, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS),
may make the designation. This means an arbitrator has gone through
a sifting process, has been appointed to one of the panels, and the
agency has offered a select number of names to parties requesting a list.
That procedure involves discarding unacceptable arbitrators and listing
preferences for. others. If appointed by AAA, an arbitrator deals with
the parties only through the Association; he has no direct contact with
them by letter or telephone, only at the hearing itself. The setting of the
time and place for the hearing and similar arrangements are made by
AAA. If appointed by FMCS or contacted by a party or parties acting
on their own, arrangements are handled by the arbitrator. If the parties
55
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have gotten together and selected an arbitrator, he must be careful to
maintain equality and deal with the parties jointly.
I prefer to deal with the parties in writing because conference calls
are inconvenient, and if I call one party or the other, there can be some
uneasiness. Occasionally the parties' appointing letter will indicate that
the arbitrator may use Mr. X or Ms. Y as contact. In that case, of course,
the arbitrator is entitled to deal with that person individually. Usually
the parties have not thought about these things. Therefore I think a letter
sent to both parties indicating two or three available dates and asking
them to list their preferences is the best way to proceed.
In writing to the parties (or talking to AAA) to suggest hearing
dates available to you, do not give too many dates; I do not give more
than two or three. Set a deadline by which the parties must respond, so
as not to leave indefinite open dates and thus he unable to schedule
anything else for them.
An arbitrator wants to avoid calling the parties individually. By
sending a joint letter with both names and the addresses of both parties,
the arbitrator accords equal treatment to the parties and has a written
record of the communications. Some arbitrators have found it preferable
to make a conference telephone call. In such cases it ought to be made
clear that this telephone call is not for a discussion of the issues, because
one or the other may try to discuss the merits of the case. The only topic
for discussion is the date and place of the hearing.
Arbitrators differ with respect to a cutoff date for cancellations after
which the parties are charged for the scheduled date. Full-time arbitrators invariably have a penalty clause, some of which are very elaborate.
The usual format requires notification of cancellation within a certain
number of days prior to the scheduled hearing or a certain percentage
of the regular per diem charge is assessed. The majority of arbitrators
do not charge a full rate. A full-time arbitrator can ordinarily put that
day to use writing an opinion and award in another case. As a moonlighting arbitrator, I usually am so happy to find I have a free date that
it does not occur to me to charge. Certainly a full-time professional
should charge; that is only fair to him. If an arbitrator has been approached by parties on their own, there ought to be a statement in his
first letter to them.

Need for Impartiality
The need for equality of treatment starts when an arbitrator is
appointed and continues throughout the proceeding. It ought to be sym-
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bolized by a whole set of little gestures which may not seem terribly
important in and of themselves, but all of which together create the
notion that the arbitrator is not a friend of either party in the handling
of this case. I usually make a point not to come early to the hearing
room. I like to have both parties there first so I am not found chatting
amiably with one side when the other arrives. When I do arrive, I
introduce myself and shake hands with all the principals around the
room. If there is an audience, I do not circulate through the audience.
If, as it often happens at the outset of one's career, there are friends
present, I try to say hello first to a person who is not a friend. Needless
to say, once the hearing starts, the counsel are addressed as Mr. or Ms.;
do not use first names. I feel this is most necessary for somebody who
on other occasions, as one of my closet friends, would be called by his
first name. I think these little touches are important.
When the meal recess comes, I do not join a party for lunch or
dinner, even though it means a lonely session at the table instead of a
convivial get-together with an old chum. I express my regrets and go off
by myself; that is the safest route. Very rarely, the two parties will say
that they are not planning any caucuses at the lunch hour, are going to
eat together, and ask the arbitrator to join them. There is no problem
then, if nothing about the case is said to one or the· other of the two
groups. Surprisingly, even good friends sometimes try to take advantage
in these situations.
It is extremely uncomfortable to walk into the hearing room and
find only one party there, strenuously insisting that his witnesses are
present and he is ready to begin. The case may have been scheduled
three months ago and the other party called five minutes ago to say he
cannot make it and wants a postponement. The party in attendance
doesn't want a postponement and is ready to go forward with the evidence.

Ex Parle Hearings
American Arbitration Association rules provide that the arbitrator
can, in appropriate circumstances, hold an ex parte hearing. I strongly
advise, if possible, not to do that. Try to persuade the moving party not
to push on the request, and find some good reason the motion should
not be granted. It would be troublesome to proceed and is like~y t? lead
to a court suit. To proceed would be to negate one of the most s1gmficant
functions of arbitration, which is to heal whatever wounds the grievance
has caused and to maintain the relationship between the parties. Often
the latter is far more important, and you have heard said again and again
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that it is not important who wins or loses the particular case anyway.
All of the differences between the parties will be exacerbated if an ex
parte hearing occurs. Only under unusual circumstances in which, for
rxample, the person present would be under the most serious inconvenience, or there is an extremely pressing time element, should an ex
parte hearing be held. Make sure the evidence is placed on the record;
do not accept some kind of motion for a default judgment. Make the
party present enough evidence so as to get a sense of the facts, even if
it is only coming from one side.
Although arbitrators ordinarily do not like to ask questions, at an
ex parte hearing I think arbitrators must do so, to ensure that any obvious
points that might have been made by the other side are at least reflected
factually in the record in order not to wind up with a record that will
lead to an easy subsequent court reversal. In a modest way, ask a few
questions.

Ground Rules
I revert now to the usual two-party hearing. At the very outset I
like to go over ground rules with the parties, if I have not dealt with
them before. I discuss my notion of conducting a hearing but emphasize
that the parties are ultimately the ones to be served. If they have any
particular desires about procedure, I want to conform to them insofar as
I find nothing unseemly or otherwise inappropriate about doing so.
I make known my feelings about how we should proceed. I like an
orderly hearing, but also a relatively relaxed and informal one. I do not
generally favor technical objections, including hearsay objections; in
almost any situation I will accept the evidence and later weigh it on
credibility grounds. Ordinarily I will not rule it inadmissible. I want
everyone to feel he has had his say. I hope that the participants will not
be unduly repetitious, and I will entertain objections if a party seems
to be piling up too much cumulative evidence. I will try to keep the
parties from getting into personalities unnecessarily, and I will sustain
objections to the harassment of witnesses. This simply gives a sense of
the kind of proceeding that I expect to have.
I pass appearance lists down each side of the room, asking the
parties, their counsel, and witnesses to give their names, titles, and
addresses, and at the same time I ask them to designate who is to receive
copies of the award and how many copies they wish to receive. I then
ask whether or not the parties want to have their witnesses sworn. Parties
vary, although employers tend to favor testimony under oath, especially
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in disciplinary cases. If they defer to me, I will have the witnesses sworn,
if it is at all likely there will he disputed questions of fact.
If the witnesses ·are to he sworn, I take it very seriously. I stand
and face a standing witness, ask him to raise his right hand, and intone
the oath. I do not run through it simply as chatter; I think it is important
to treat it seriously. I do it individually. This reminder has greater impact
on the testimony if each witness is sworn individually just before testifying, rather than as a group. I am willing to leave up in the air the
issue of whether the swearing in of witnesses is done at all, but once
the decision is made to do it, I do not want to cheapen it. Taking an
oath is an important piece of business, and if it is going to be done, I
want it done well.
Part of my philosophy is that I am at the parties' disposal. They
are the ones who are setting the ground rules, as long as the rules are
not offensive to me. Arbitrators differ on this. There are some who, while
they may say they seek to follow the parties' wishes, take over the whole
show after they are appointed and tell the parties how the hearing is to
be conducted. Stylistically, I like to be a bit more deferential. I find I
usually make most of the decisions anyway.
I tell the parties that I am going to maintain three strings of exhibits:
a series of joint exhibits (J) which the parties agree upon, a union series
(U), and an employer series (R). I try to collect the joint exhibits which
the parties have agreed or can agree on before the record commences.
If it is a hearing with a transcript, as soon as the hearing formally opens,
I will repeat all the joint exhibits that have been introduced so they may
be noted and numbered in the record.
I require nothing in advance of the hearing itself. The current
tendency is not to ask for an advance stipulation of the issue and not
to get it. Ordinarily the arbitrator will not even know the nature of the
dispute. Sometimes because of the way the parties opt for a special
expedited procedure there will be an indication that it is a disciplinary
case. Very rarely does someone send the arbitrator a copy of a contract.
Practically never is anything other than that sent ahead of time. I am
naturally a procrastinating person, and I am not troubled by this. After
all, 30 to 40 percent of the cases are not heard, and I hate to think of
having read a contract and then not having the case go forward.

Official Record
Certain formalities of a hearing are often overdone; one is the matter
of transcripts. In an ordinary discipline or discharge case in which there
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is no complex legal theory involved, I think that transcripts are superfluous. They do not really add to what the arbitrator takes int~ ac~oun_t.
They are unduly expensive not only because of t~e reporter s time. m
preparing the transcript but also because of the time tha~ th~ ~art1es
and the arbitrator are going to spend going over that transcnpt, if m fact
it is produced. In talking with people at conferences and else~h~re, I
make this plea and try to alert the parties to what the vast maJonty ?f
fellow arbitrators that I have talked with assure me is correct, that m
the ordinary discipline or discharge case, the transcript is usually of
little help and is simply an expensive luxury.
That is not true in complicated cases involving contract interpretation or complex job classification issues. In those cases a transcript
can be extremely useful. In almost all cases the parties could arrange
for a tape recording which is just about as helpful as a transcript and
costs next to nothing. The quality of inexpensive cassette recorders has
now been so improved that there is little trouble in a fairly sizable room
in capturing all the testimony for forty-five minutes a side. It takes only
ten seconds to flip the cassette over or replace it. This seems to me an
excellent compromise solution to the problem of transcripts. I ask the
parties in nearly all cases where there is not a transcript if I may use
my own tape recorder, whether or not they are using one, and I find
this extremely helpful. It means that I need not interrupt the witness to
ask for matters to be repeated.
I take copious notes, and, incidentally, the notes are the official
reco_rds of the proceeding, unless the parties have agreed on the preparat wn of an official transcript. However, the tape is available if nect'ssary_ to refr~sh my_ recollection or to take care of a mass of figures.
Oecas10nally it provides an exact comparison of the testimony of witnesses when ~hey ar~ ~lashing on crucial points, and often the significan~e of certam det~1ls m one piece of testimony does not become evident
until the second w1t~ess has testified. I keep a running tally of the
number 0 [ each tape side together with my notes so that it takes no more
than a mmu_t~ to_ locate an exact passage to recheck. I do not spend a
whole day Ii st en_mg to tapes from beginning to end. That would be an
unnecessary ?ram on the parties' time and my own. I use them sim l
f~r confi~ati_on or ~mplification of :what my notes said or clarificatfo~
od a_ conN ict ml te~hmony. A number of arbitrators are now using this
ev1ce. atura ly 1f a p rt b ·
Id
h
l
, b. a y o Jects,
o not proceed. It is not required
or an ar itrator to give advance notice to the parties of hi;
do~evetr,
esire o use a recorder.
ciplin~::e

t~:

aa:bitr~tor does not kno_w whether it is an ordinary disery involved contract interpretation case, and therefore
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cannot dete~ine in advance whether a transcript would be helpful or
n?t, ~he parties make that decision. I am always willing to express my
~le"_' ma conference or to the parties in an informal setting that transcripts
m simple cases are not very helpful and not worth the cost in time or
trouble, hut I would not do so in a given hearing. There I am the parties'
servant. If I "_'al~ in and a reporter is present, I say nothing, leave my
tape recorder m its holder, and go on about my business. In the absence
of an official reporter, the parties actually tell me if I can use my own
tape recorder.
The parties usually do not have a conflict about whether or not
there should he a transcript. If either party wants a transcript, there is
a transcript, and if only one party wants a transcript, then that party
pays. The AAA rules so provide. The parties frequently dispute over
whether or not a recording should be made. My position is that if either
party objects, there will not be any recording, including mine. I sometimes feel I am pandering to a silly superstition in treating recordings
this way, because it is quite clear that under accepted arbitration procedures either party has a right to a transcript if it insists upon it and
is willing to pay for it.
If only one party is willing to pay for a transcript, I take the position
that my notes are the official record of that proceeding. If only the
employer gets the transcript {which means the union does not agree to
pay for it as well) and would like the transcript to be the official record,
an arbitrator may respond by saying that he will get a copy of the
transcript and make it available to the union, because if it is going to
he the official record they have to have access to it. There is one other
way that it is sometimes done, and that is for the company to let their
copy he made available for the union's examination and use in the
company's offices. That is a convenient way to work it out. My position
is if the company merely wants the transcript for its own purposes,
however that is not the official record of the proceeding, but my notes
are. My ~osition is that the employer can make the transcript the official
record if he is willing to make it available to the union and t? ~e,. but
not if it is for his exclusive use and benefit. That is the d1stmct10n.
AAA Rule 21 seems in accord.
I have never had a party ask to see my notes. I would have no
objection to making them available. Other arb~trators_ might di~a~e.
In speaking of the official record, I refer only to its use m the arh1trahon
itself for briefing and decisional purposes.
.
.
My view that the arbitrator's notes are the official reco~ 1s shared
by other arbitrators. The essence of my posi~ion is that _n~thmg ~lse can
be the offical record of an arhitral proceedmg unless 1t 1s available to
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me and all the parties. Once the employer gives mt> a copy, I am
prepared, if the union wants, to let the union see it and use it in preparing
a brief. If the employer wants a record either in tape or transcript form
for his own purposes only, I do not regard that as the official record.
We are probably exaggerating this as a practical point, because I have
never had an employer ask for a transcript and not want me to have a
copy.
In those situations where the union does not have practical, as
distinguished from theoretical, access, I would insist that the transcript
was not the official record of those proceedings. AAA Rule 21 states
the arbitrator is to determine when and where the other party may inspect
the transcript, if it is the official record. With regard to recordings, I
am adamant that the official record is my notes. Tape recordings are
simply too fallible and easily doctored.
In cases of enforcement or vacation of an award, parties may seek
to get the arbitrator's notes. Often an arbitrator does not just take down
what a person said, but also makes notes alongside, including credibility
determinations and judgments of what he considers important. He would
not want the parties to have access to these notes.
Setting aside the question of how arrangements could be made for
transcribing an arbitrator's notes with appropriate deletions of extraneous
material, I find it hard to see how those notes would not be subject to
subpoena if one of the parties wanted to subpoena the official record of
that proceeding. Any party that wants either to enforce or resist the
award would be entitled to the whole official record. I do not know that
it has ever come up. I have seen no cases on this question.
Most arbitrators would say that if no statement is made by the
arbitrator as to his policy with regard to his notes being the official
record, and no other statement is made by the parties, there is sound
precedent to believe that the record is the arbitrator's notes. However,
it is not the making of the statement, it is the recording of the notes
that makes them the official record. I want to repeat that whenever
arbitrators have said their notes were the official record, as far as I know
they have been thinking of the disposition of the arbitration case. They
have not been thinking of whether or not it is the kind of public document
that would be subject to subpoena in a subsequent court or agency
proceeding. Perhaps better policy calls for preventing anyone from going
behind the arbitrator's decision to look at his notes and the scratchings
he might have made along the margin. If the arbitrator's notes were
subject to subpoena, they should certainly pass through some kind of
excising or laundering process. I do not know of a single arbitrator who
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has been confronted with this problem. I do not think this is a matter
of general concern.

Sequestration of Witnesses
One of the parties may ask for sequestration of witnesses. I always
wince when that occurs because it suggests that arbitration is not going
to serve one of its worthwhile therapeutic functions. Everybody in that
room, most of whom have an intense interest in the case, is not now
going to have a chance to hear the whole story come forth, to get a sense
of what actually occurred, and maybe have his or her recollection jarred.
Nonetheless, my inclination is to grant the request with any reasonable
basis presented for the making of it. This is especially true in cases of
discharge when there is likely to be eyewitness testimony, and there
may be contradictions.
The issue will come up much less frequently in contract interpretation, job classification, or technical grievance. It arises when there is
the possibility of conflicting eyewitness testimony, and I realize in those
situations why a party may legitimately not want any witness aware of
what others are saying or be influenced by their comments, so I grant
that motion. If one party requests sequestration and the other party
vigorously objects, I would ordinarily grant the request, with regrets.
There is a qualification which should be noted. The parties themselves are entitled to be present, including the individual grievant. The
testimony of the individual grievant, perhaps the person discharged,
obviously may be affected by what other witnesses say. Nonetheless,
there is an overriding interest in the party grievant being present and
being able to hear everything. Therefore, the grievant is an exception
to the sequestration rule.

Framing the Issue
In the best prepared cases there will be a written submission agreed
upon by the parties beforehand stating exactly what the issues are. It
will be one or more short paragraphs presenting concisely the issue and
in effect defining the arbitrator's authority. That is the question the
arbitrator must answer, and that is all.
In many cases the parties come to the hearing without having
defined the issue. Some experienced, competent arbitrators would stop
the proceedings until the parties had written out and agreed upon a
statement of the issues. Perhaps I am less demanding or naturally pro-
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crastinating and willing to let things develop, hut I do not say anything
about issues. I am prepared to let the proceedings unfold and listen to
how the parties frame the issue. Each party may frame it a little differently
or ultimately leave it to me to help articulate the issue.
At some point in the proceeding I like to make a brief statement
of my own as to what I understand to be the real question between the
parties and have their agreement. Sometimes I phrase it in terms of
opposing arguments: I understand the parties' position; the union essentially is saying this; the company is saying essentially that; am I
essentially right on this? That is my way of phrasing the issue and
handling this troublesome problem, which some fine arbitrators say they
simply will not allow to occur. Until they have the parties' written, signed
submission, they feel that they do not have the authority as an arbitrator
to dispose of it. I have never felt at the end of the hearing that I did
not know the problem which was at the heart of the case.
Opening Statements

When an arbitrator receives notification of selection from an appointing agency, the matter at issue is not stated. I like opening statements. If there is anything that would be really helpful ahead of time,
although I do not ask for it, it would be a prehearing statement or
memorandum. I am not thinking of anything elaborate, but there is
nothing that is more helpful, especially if we are dealing with something
of any complexity, than to have a good statement in advance of the
reception of any evidence as to just what the position of each party is.
Ordinarily this is not hard to secure. Most people want to express their
concerns. The only difficulty I have encountered is after the moving
party makes the opening statement, the other party may ask to reserve
its statement until the presentation of his side of the case. If I think
there is some reason for that, I accept it, especially in discharge or
disciplinary cases.
In a disciplinary case it is ordinarily assumed that the employer
has the burden of proof and goes forward first. The union wants to find
out exactly what the employer will set forth as the basis for the discipline
or the discharge, and what the evidence is. The union then wants to
deal with that in its opening statement. I am prepared to follow that
procedure.
In other types of cases, such as a contract interpretation case, I
want to hear both sides at the outset if at all possible because it aids
me immensely in following the reasons and ruling upon any objections
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that may come up in the course of the hearing. I like to get the two
juxtaposed. I have as good a notion at that point as if they were to argue
for hours about a written stipulation of just what the difference of position
is and what the issue is in this case. I have it without forcing the parties
to play games and try to reach a written submission that for whatever
reason they have not done voluntarily on their own. That is my solution,
and I really think in most cases it works well.
Assuming I do know the nature of the case, I have no established
rule as to which party I ask to speak first. The hearing is not a highly
stylized, structured setting. It is very important to understand that the
arbitrator is simply formulating the issue that the parties have presented,
even though they cannot agree on the wording of it. The arbitrator is
not formulating his own issue between the parties; he is simply characterizing in his language the issue they have brought him. In the vast
majority of cases I find this no problem whatsoever. However, there are
competent, experienced arbitrators who insist that they have a written
issue submitted to them, agreed upon by the parties, or else they will
not go forward.
In the Northeast and the Midwest, where I tend to arbitrate, I have
had only a few cases in which the parties have presented me with a
stipulation of specific issues at the outset of the hearing. At most the
stipulated issue may be whether the employer has violated article X of
the labor agreement. In other parts of the country this may vary.
Ordinarily the applicable contract provision comes up in the stipulated issue or in the opening statement. Remember this is a telescoped
process. It is also a free-floating process in which the arbitrator may
ask the question, what does this case generally involve, to which the
parties will probably answer that it is a disciplinary or job promotion
case. If it is a discipline case, I ordinarily make some comment to the
effect that I assume the company is ready to proceed first, and the
company invariably says yes. If it is not a disciplinary case I ask if the
union is prepared to open.
In most cases which do not involve discipline, the union will go
first. On the basis of who is to lead off, I ask if that party wishes to
present an opening statement. A concise statement of what the problem
is as one party sees it and then as the other party sees it follows.
In most discharge cases, the formulation of the issue is not important, and I do not mind waiting until the end of the company's case
before hearing what the union has to say. The issue is usually simple,
that is, was there just cause for the discipline.
If it is a more complicated case, however, there can be a battle
over precisely what that issue is, or at least how it should be worded.
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That is where I prefer not to sharpen the question too much if I feel that
by letting each party state the issue I can get a sense of what it is and
reformulate it, thus stating the issue as I see it. Almost invariably there
is a quiet assent that that is the situation. I am then ready to proceed.
Stipulation of Facts

In an effort to shorten the hearing, I often give the parties a chance
to enter into some factual stipulations to which both parties agree in
order to save time used in putting people on to testify. Depending upon
what I hear in that opening statement, I may say that there appears no
dispute between the parties as to A, B, and C and ask if they are prepared
to stipulate that. Ordinarily there will be no disagreement about certain
facts such as dates and places, or the number of years an employee has
worked. Often there will be no dispute about the time an employee was
employed but considerable dispute as to precisely what that employee's
seniority is. The arbitrator can easily avoid unnecessary and repetitious
testimony by clearing the desk of undisputed facts at the outset.
I have never received anything argumentative directly from a party
in advance of a hearing. Presumably any sort of prehearing brief would
go through AAA, if it is one of their cases. My position is that before
the arbitrator receives anything from anybody, the other party should be
given the chance to respond. In terms of time, that might not be possible.
I would be quite prepared to receive at the hearing a copy of the opening
statement or a more elaborate version of it, on condition, of course, that
the other side receive a copy too. I would not read beyond the line where
I recognized a unilateral communication without notifying the other party
and eliciting their response. I said at the outset that it is important to
maintain always a posture of neutrality and impartiality and avoid anything that would give one side the feeling that the other was getting some
undeserved benefit in the handling of the case.
Burden of Proof
There are some things that are important to keep in mind both as
theoretical propositions and very practical points. Arbitrators will say
again and again that the burden of proof does not mean much in arbitration, that all the arbitrator really wants to do is find out which side
has the stronger case, what are the real facts, and what is the meaning
of the contract .. He is not interested in who has the burden of proof or
what the quantity of that burden is, if that further issue comes up. In

Arbitration Procedures

67

the vast majority of cases, for all practical purposes, that is a sound
statement. It does not make much difference about burden of proof if
you are satisfied one way or the other way how the case should come
out.
One of the things I have discovered to my chagrin and occasional
anguish, however, is that there are cases in which I simply cannot decide
which side has prevailed when I am finished. As long as I can avoid
reaching that mental state, I do not need to go on to the next question
that I now raise. I have not been able to avoid it, and I do not know
many other arbitrators who will not confess to the same predicament
from time to time. In such a situation the arbitrator has to rule one way
or the other, and I do not know how one can deny that it depends upon
who has the burden of persuasion. In the usual case it is the grieving
party, who is moving for relief of remedy under the contract. It is that
party which has the burden of prevailing by a preponderance of the
evidence.
There is a well-accepted exception to this rule, that being cases of
discipline and discharge in which it is usually felt that the employer
has the burden of proof, on the theory the employer has within his
knowledge a greater sense of the facts as to why he acted in disciplining
the employee. I am not sure that is the only explanation for placing the
burden of proof upon the employer in discipline cases. There are other
situations in which the employer probably has a better sense of the facts.
For example, whether a particular employee is qualified for a job and
thus was entitled to get it on the basis of seniority is also a question on
which the employer may well have readier access to the critical data.
However, the classic arbitrator's position is that the union has the burden
of proof of persuading the arbitrator that the employer made a mistake
in promoting someone else. Whatever the precise reasoning-it may be
in part a feeling that the disciplined employee is subject to a serious
hurt, especially in a discharge case-the traditional view is that the
company ought to carry the burden of proof.
Moreover, while in the usual case the burden of proof must be
sustained only by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, one finding
is more likely than not 51-49, in the discipline or discharge case most
arbitrators use a slightly different formulation. In cases where the reason
for the discharge is the sort of reprehensible, immoral conduct that would
amount to a criminal offense if tried in the courts, some arbitrators go
so far as to say, and unions invariably argue for it, that there must be
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, using the old criminal law standard.
After handling a number of these cases, I have come to the conclusion that I am prepared to uphold a discharge where I would not be
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prepared to send the grievant to prison. This is a very pragmatic reaction,
hut it satisfies me that I am not using the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. On the other hand, I want something more than 51-49 before
I uphold a discharge. I want something that I can call clear and convincing, if that is any help at all in defining a standard in between
preponderance and beyond reasonable doubt.
I want to emphasize that arbitrators take different positions on this.
One groups says beyond reasonable doubt, relying on the criminal law
analogy; others are prepared to accept a preponderance of the evidence,
emphasizing that these are civil cases. My hunch is that a majority of
arbitrators want more than a preponderance in a discharge case at least,
and maybe in any discipline case as well.
I do not think that all this is embroidery. I have tried enough cases
in which I have concluded to myself that the company has satisfied me
that probably the employee did this thing, but there was a lot of conflict.
It was very, very close, so close that even though I thought it was
probable, I did not think it was clear and convincing, and I did sustain
the discharge. On the other hand, I have had cases in which I would
not have sent the man to prison, where I would not have been able as
a member of a jury to find him guilty; nonetheless I was prepared to
sustain the discharge. At least it was clear and convincing.
There is another distinction to be made. A significant number of
arbitrators only apply the stiffer standard of beyond a reasonable doubt
when the conduct is morally reprehensible, when there is criminal-like
activity alleged by reason that even though the man is not being sent to
prison by a criminal court, the stain on his record in the employment
field is going to be of exactly the same nature. His future chances of
getting a job with a theft discharge sustained will be seriously impaired,
and thus that stiffer standard is considered appropriate.

Rules of Evidence
The strict rules of evidence do not apply to arbitration. However,
I find an increasing tendency for proceedings to become formalized. I
am not sure that this is because of the presence of lawyers. Certainly
lay pe?pl~ can be just as formalistic, sometimes even pettifoggingly so.
I am mclmed to think that it is in the nature of almost any kind of
process whose initial flexibility may depend upon the fact that there are
not any rules-if there are not any rules, there is no precedent. As time
go~s by, people get used to doing things in a more structured way. Many
thmgs that we have talked about today are fairly well accepted. There
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are big battles about what precisely is the official record of the proceedings, because we do not have a precedent. As we set the precedent,
people accept it and want to follow the rules. A process that began by
having a good deal of play in the joints becomes a hit more rigid.
I am not unhappy about some of the movements in this direction,
hut I am unhappy about others. For example, it is still very hard for an
arbitrator to convince a pair of representatives, if they are lawyers, not
to heap hearsay objections even though I have indicated that there is
almost no kind of hearsay objection that I am going to sustain unless a
witness is right there, available to testify, and they try to give me his
or her affidavit. I find that objectionable; why should not the witness
testify? I am generally prepared to accept hearsay for the most part,
even hearsay that is in the form of an affidavit. I may give it insignificant
weight, and I am certainly not going to give it as much weight as I would
a person who has testified and who is subject to cross-examination, hut
I will not rule it as inadmissible. I will sustain objections when testimony
becomes unnecessarily repetitious or if there is unnecessary personal
vilification or harassment of a witness. I try to avoid being any more
definite or legalistic than I have to in rulings on objections. I tend to
allow the parties to proceed a bit further. Then finally enough has been
heard on that particular point. I try to maintain an informal air, even
about rulings.
There is one troublesome area, and that is an attempt to introduce
evidence that raises a serious question of relevancy. The threshold question is, does the proffered evidence have anything to do with the issue
in the case. This is not evidence that is incompetent or to which objections may be raised that it be inadmissible because it is hearsay; the
question is purely relevancy. One might say that to admit it is part of
the general process of purging feelings, and that putting everything out
on the table is one of the hallmarks of arbitration. Supposedly, there is
a great therapeutic value in that process. It places the other side in a
dilemma. Should the party take the time and trouble to refute the new
evidence, which hypothetically has nothing to do with the case, or should
he ignore it and run the risk the arbitrator will later consider it relevant?
If I am completely satisfied that the evidence that is being offered does
not bear in any way on the issue presented by this case, I shall not
accept it.
Let me illustrate a troublesome, specific evidentiary problem. An
employee has been fired. At the time of the firing, the employee was
supplied with a written statement to the effect that he was discharged
because of insubordination to Foreman X. The contract might have said
that at the time of discharge there must be a written statement of reasons
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supplied to the employee with a copy to the union, or there might not
have been such a provision in the contract. At the hearing the employer
tries to show that the employee had a very bad work record, habitual
absenteeism and tardiness, and that these were the reasons discharge
was thought to be the appropriate penalty.
Ordinarily one may think that the past record of an employee should
always be pertinent in a decision dealing with the type of discipline
imposed, but on the other hand, at the time the discharge was madeand let us assume also in subsequent grievance steps-the only thing
that was talked about was the insubordination. The past record was never
mentioned.
The union, of course, stoutly insists-and a good deal of arbitration
precedent supports this position, at least when the contract says there
must be a reason supplied at the time of discharge-that the only reasons
that can be used at the arbitration hearing to justify discharge are those
presented to the employee at the time of discharge. What happened in
the past to buttress the penalty imposed cannot be introduced, otherwise
the preceding grievance procedure would be undercut, and the union
would be caught by surprise at arbitration. When it is quite clear that
only one reason was assigned and especially when the contract requires
that the reasons be supplied, I will not accept evidence with regard to
the employee's bad past record.
Needless to say, if the employee had a good record during twenty
years of service with an unblemished disciplinary record and is now
discharged, the union proffers that record of past performance to try to
demonstrate that the discharge penalty is too stiff. At that point I take
the position that the union can bring in the past record to contest the
discharge, although I say that once the employee's past record is raised
by the union as a basis for knocking out the discharge, it opens up the
past record; anything that was negative (and not subject to a contractual
exclusion) can be used by the employer to try to offset the good portions
of it. Usually a union makes a shrewd judgment in advance on whether
or not to bring up the past record.
It is sensible for an employer to look at the total record of the
employee. Arbitrators do not want to become enmeshed in a situation
tying arbitration up with all the niceties of common-law pleading. The
principal and final incident that really provoked the company was insubordination. It may well be that it is implicit in the employment
relationship that every discipline imposed really reflects-in what is
regarded as very good industrial relations philosophy-a kind of progressive discipline, which is based on the entire past record.
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If I find there was an oral discussion at the time of discharge whereby
the employee knew the company was considering all the past incidents,
even though the only thing marked on the official notification was insubordination, I let the employer use those past incidents, giving such
weight as I feel is appropriate, depending upon their seriousness, their
similarity to the type of incident now involved, and the time when they
occurred. Obviously something that occurred twenty years ago is going
to be given little if any weight. I try to be a little flexible in this, but if
I am convinced that right up until the hearing the union had no reason
to know that anything was going to be relied upon except that one
incident, I will regard other evidence as irrelevant and inadmissible.
In a very tightly written contract limiting me to the written statement, I do not want to tie myself up too much with common-law pleading
technicalities. I try to see ultimately that the case is handled in a
commonsense fashion to the best of my ability, that the outcome is one
that the parties can understand, and that it neither suprises nor offends
them. If the union and the employee were quite aware from the whole
tenor of the discussion that this employee had had a whole series of
things go wrong, and that this was part of the reason for the discharge,
even though insubordination was the only thing written, my inclination
is to ask to hear all the facts to see what I think of it.
Another qualification that most arbitrators will apply is not to allow
anything in from the past record to help sustain the penalty unless it
was made known at the time to the employee that this was a matter that
management considered improper, and the employee would then have
had a chance to grieve. I offended a company attorney and a union
attorney within the space of two weeks with dissimilar rulings based on
the distinction between an established system of progressive discipline
and an on-the-spot discharge later buttressed with evidence of oral warnings. In a case where no notion of progressive discipline had ever been
communicated because it had never been part of the policy between
union and employer, I refused to admit a past record and confined the
employer to the written reasons furnished to the employee. On the other
hand, in another case in which an employee was marked one point for
the first incident, two points for the second, and in geometric progression
leading to discharge after a certain accumulation within a specified time
despite the fact that the only thing that was fastened upon at the time
of the discharge was the final culminating incident, I did accept evidence
with regard to incidents in the past about which the employee had been
warned orally and in writing and for which points had been imposed,
because I regarded this as so much an accepted practice within the
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company and well known and accepted by the umon that it was an
implied part of the final step.
In the first case, in which I said I would not accept the past record,
the company went considerably further than the written statement. It
went all the way through the grievance procedure on the basis of the
final incident alone, as a matter of fact. In the opening statement,
company counsel said that the only thing they needed to determine was
whether or not the employee acted reasonably under the circumstances,
and then to the surprise and outrage of the union, the employer tried to
introduce evidence of past misdeeds toward the close of its case.
I have every reason to think that those past misdeeds, if the ground
had been properly laid for them, would have been supportive of the
discipline. I got a sense of what they were in passing upon the objection.
I think they were matters that the employee was aware of, that he had
had a chance to grieve, and that he was probably guilty. I know, if
admitted, that they would have affected my thinking, but I was deeply
troubled that at no point in the grievance procedure was this prior record
mentioned. The union had no reason to take it into account in deciding
on, or preparing for, arbitration. If one thinks about this, there is a
question about the extent to which an arbitrator ought to help preserve
the functioning of the informal process for the resolution of grievances,
the grievance procedure itself. To the extent an arbitrator allows it to
be bypassed, he is to that extent undermining it.
I take a much more relaxed attitude toward most new evidence, as
long as I am satisfied that the other party is not being unfairly surprised
and that it has a reasonable chance to respond. Unfortunately-and this
undoubtedly undermines the grievance procedure a bit-I think it is
beyond the realm of human nature to engage in quite as systematic an
examination of the facts, giving a thorough thinking-through of the theory
of the case, during the informal grievance sessions as when the case
has been labeled for arbitration. It may indeed be only after the decision
to go to arbitration has been made that a lawyer is ever involved.
It may be inconsistent with my theory of relevance, but I would
permit the union to introduce evidence about the employee's age, marital
status, unemployment, number of children, and other personal factors
that are typically used in a discharge case after ruling the employee's
past record inadmissible. As a practical matter, it has been so long
accepted that the nature of a good employment record is automatically
relevant to a disciplinary proceeding that I always let a union introduce
it.
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To anyone who wishes to pursue further the issues of procedural
regularity, I commend R. W. Fleming's The Labor Arbitration Process. 1
He addresses this question of when to admit past misconduct, first in
justifying the penalty (he is largely favorable toward that), second on
the issue of the witness's credibility, and third on the question of guilt
itself-whether it is more probable than not that since he has done this
kind of thing in the past he has probably done it on this occasion.
Consider a closely related situation of a man who has stolen goods every
Friday night for the past two months and is charged with another Friday
night theft, but he denies it. I would admit that evidence, but I do not
know how much weight I would give it. If the man had been arrested
for theft on the outside in an entirely different situation, I would not
admit it. Arbitrators rely heavily on the particular facts of particular
cases; they do not like sweeping rules.
Intervention by Arbitrator
I add a few words about the arbitrator's role in the handling of
witnesses to show the sensitivities of the parties on this. Lawyers become
incensed when an arbitrator intervenes in a case in a substantial way.
The lawyer who gives a client a botched bit of representation, making
the arbitrator feel he must intervene in the name of justice, is being
shown up in front of his client, and the lawyer does not like that one
whit. The opposing lawyer who grinned as he saw his adversary botch
up his client's case is incensed that the arbitrator becomes an advocate
for the other side. It is a terrible dilemma in some cases. The arbitrator
should rely on his conscience and common sense, be as discreet as he
can, and neither embarrass the parties nor inject himself to the point of
dealing with issues that the parties have not raised. He should not open
doors where there may be skeletons that both parties feel should be kept
safely locked in. Especially when dealing with good lawyers, an arbitrator
should not blunder into matters he thinks are obviously relevant but that
the lawyers are not dealing with. They have their reasons, if they are
good lawyers. Naturally, judgments have to be made about this.
If there is something that I think is truly important that is not being
dealt with, I occasionally, during a recess, take the two lawyers aside
and say that I do not understand why a certain contract provision does
not have some bearing on this case and could they explain it to me.
Sometimes they can do so, and it becomes perfectly understandable.
1 Champaign,

University of Illinois (1965).
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Sometimes one lawyer becomes angry for my having pointed it out and
the other one pounces, emphasizing its significance and believing it will
win the case for him. Unfortunately it does sometimes, so that is dangerous. The arbitrator has made an enemy. There is a constant tension
between having them play the game as a sporting event and trying to do
justice. On occasion I find that rather traumatic.
I urge strongly in writing an award, especially if modifying any
kind of penalty in a discharge or discipline case, that the arbitrator read
the contract concerning his authority, particularly with respect to remedies. For example, in a disciplinary case he should determine whether
he is entitled to modify the employer's sanction, required to sustain it,
or may set it aside in toto. At the close he should try to get both parties
to give a brief oral summation of just what their points are, if there is
any doubt at all. Alternatively, the arbitrator may sum up his understanding of the parties' positions, and ask them if it is correct. At least .
they will go away content, happy that they got their arguments across.
Although it is very difficult to generalize, I think I would take a
more activist role if I think the grievant's union counsel is not doing a
good job than in a contract interpretation case wherein it is not an
individual who may be hurt. There is a device that may permit an
arbitrator diplomatically to do a little more than otherwise could be done
without causing offense. While trying to convey the notion that I am not
raising a new issue or reaching into new areas but simply making sure
that I understand what is testified to, I sometimes ask for clarification
that I understand properly a certain point. I then ask a question that
carries beyond the question that has previously been asked, but not so
much so that it appears I am taking over the questioning. I do not want
to do that for more than about two questions at a time. However, occasionally I am concerned there is going to be a serious miscarriage of
justice. Employers and unions are often upset at this, but the arbitrator
owes a responsibility to himself as well as to the process and the parties,
and I do not want to be a collaborator in an injustice.
Obviously it affects the arbitrator if there is a great disparity in the
quality of counsel or if a lawyer opposes a lay person. Needless to say,
one party, usually the employer, is incensed that the money spent in
order to have superior representation is being counterbalanced in any
way by the arbitrator who is hired not to represent the other side but to
serve as the impartial arbiter. Quite certainly, professional representatives will take umbrage at any public intervention, even when it is
helpful.
The contract is usually introduced as an exhibit and becomes part
of the record. For example, there is a grievance that something is contrary
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to that contract. Frequently the sections allegedly violated will be specified, but it is generally accepted that unless there is a square stipulation
to the contrary, the entire contract may be examined to shed light on
the meaning of the cited sections. The problem I have is really more a
matter of diplomacy than authority. Am I a bull in a china shop who is
opening up matters that should have been kept in the closet? Am I
embarrassing one of the parties to no good end? Those are matters of
diplomacy and they must be worked out by feeling one's way.
It is very easy to say that theoretically the arbitrator is a passive
spectator who, at the end of the match, decides who wins. When an
arbitrator sees something that he thinks can be corrected, there is a
terrible itch to prevent injustice. It does not just concern the union and
the company, for there is another party involved, the grievant. There is
a much stronger case for intervention when there is an individual grievant
than when there is a big contract problem that is more abstract.

Role of Counsel
Fortunately, I have never personally been involved in a case where
there was any clash between the union and a grievant's separate outside
counsel. It has come up more in recent times, especially in minority
cases with unfair representation claims in the background. That the
union represents the grievant would be the classical response of the
parties to collective bargaining agreements, and I believe that most
arbitrators would agree. I like to think that some of the racial suspicions
of a few years ago have been receding in industrial relations, and that
there is not as much antagonism between minority members and their
unions. Some of the steam behind the move for third-party representation
has dissipated, but there was a time when academic commentators, not
the parties in the field, were indeed trying to devise theories that would
permit minorities to be represented by counsel of their own choosing at
arbitrations.
I find most post-hearing briefs in the simpler, standard discipline
cases a waste of effort. They extend the time and cost, and they do not
affect the decision that I probably reached driving home following the
hearing. Do remember to set dates for briefs and tell the parties when
the award will be. Make sure both sides understand that, and end
graciously. Thank them both for their help and professional presentations.
When an arbitrator is satisfied that union counsel has done a good
job in representing a losing grievant, especially in a case that for any
reason might later prove troublesome, he might specifically point out
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that a fine presentation was made on behalf of the grievant, but not
before the case is decided; that would be misread. If the discharge is
sustained, it should be included in the opinion and award. If that sort
of commendation is fair, it can be extremely helpful to counsel in mollifying the client, perhaps even preventing an unfair representation suit.
Consent Awards
Initially, I felt very strongly about the question of consent awards
in which the parties jointly request the arbitrator to make a certain
decision, but I have become a little more troubled about some of the
practicalities of these situations. The toughest case of all is in dealing
with an individual employee. The union can handle this in a variety of
ways. It can go forward and say not one word to the arbitrator and simply
present the case in such a way as to make clear to the arbitrator that it
agrees with the company that the employee is guilty, that he ought to
be discharged, but that for some political reason the union has to go to
arbitration. Any clever counsel can manage the affair.
I have never had company and union approach me and simply say
that they had to go through with the charade, at the same time making
me aware of their feelings, and that they have no objection to the discharge being sustained. I have been approached by union and company
in situations where they wanted an interpretation of the contract and
there were political problems on both sides. They have asked me to
write the interpretation per their suggestion on grounds that I can bear
the brunt of criticism, that is what I am paid for, and that is how I would
decide the case anyway.
At least in the last instance, I am now satisfied that if it is a totally
honest and fair solution that they have agreed upon-the kind that I
might have worked toward on my own-there is nothing to cause me
not to make my award to conform. Remember: this is something that is
not wrong, it is something I might have come to on my own. It is probably
better, as a practical matter, than the decision I would have arrived at
on my own because they worked it out themselves. The problem, of
course, is that the parties are deceiving their stockholders and their
members. What is the arbitrator's function, ultimately: to keep trouble
stirred up or to resolve it?
I return to that basic question of what role should the arbitrator
play. I am quite prepared to have persons argue that as a matter of
personal honor and personal integrity-not a matter of the integrity of
the arbitration process, but personal integrity-an arbitrator is not going
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to put his name on an award he did not work out in his own mind, but
I am now much more content with the notion of the agreed award under
proper conditions.
Let me pose this question just a little differently. Suppose at the
end of a case, after all the evidence is in, the arbitrator asks the two
parties how the case should be decided and what should be the remedy.
They both come up with the same answer. One might ask why the parties
do not sign the contract and forget about an award. It sometimes happens,
however, that while they both finally concluded what was the right
answer, they do not want to carry that back to their constituencies. If
one thinks this through and can justify their proposal, one can support
it with reasons that make perfectly good sense. What exactly has the
arbitrator done that is not a furtherance of the practicalities of the
situation? He has ended a dispute and shaped a fair and sensible solution. Possibly he has caused problems for the chap who wants to run
for president of the union or president of the company. Maybe he has
done them an injustice.
The arbitrator's Code of Professional Responsibility justifies the
consent award, with appropriate safeguards. It may be analogous to the
tripartite hearing. In such a hearing, the two parties say they are really
in accord and recommend that the arbitrator, as the deciding vote, go
a certain way. They will then formally dissent from the portions of the
award that go contrary to their interests. The arbitrator may think this
is sound advice. It is exactly what he ought to do, but to the public you
are the decisive vote.
There are no easy answers to these and some other procedural
questions. For a new arbitrator, it is important to understand the issues
involved so that conscious decisions may be made as these procedural
questions arise.

